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Discussants' Response No. 1 to 
"Illegal Acts: What is The Auditor's Responsibility?" 
Editor's Note: As mentioned in the preface,  we have two discussants' 
responses for  this paper. The first  response represents the comments 
by three students from  the accounting program at the University of 
Kansas. These students were selected as the 1990 Deloitte & Touche 
Symposium Fellows. The other response is the usual academician's 
remarks by Professor  McNair, Mississippi State University. The two 
responses are given below in the order they were presented. 
Tim Damewood 
Susan Harshberger 
Russ Jones 
University of  Kansas 
Our objective in critiquing the paper by Mr. Guy, Mr. Whittington and 
Mr. Neebes is to find  ways of  improving SAS 54 [AICPA, 1988]. Our com-
ments will deal with issues related not only to reducing ambiguities in the 
interpretation and implementation of  the SAS by different  auditing firms  but 
also with expanding the scope of  SAS 54 to other issues that have not been 
considered by the profession.  Our discussion will be directed towards SAS 
54 because much of  the paper is a restatement of  the SAS. 
We will address the following  issues in our paper: 
• The distinction between direct and indirect illegal acts. 
• The auditor's competence in detecting illegal acts. 
• SAS 54's "if  necessary" clause. 
• Auditor's neutrality towards industry in detecting illegal acts. 
• Qualitative materiality. 
• Auditor's responsibility towards communicating audit findings. 
The first  issue is direct versus indirect illegal acts. In order to accomplish 
the objective of  consistent application of  the SAS, there needs to be a more 
clear distinction between direct and indirect illegal acts within the SAS. In 
the case of  direct effect  illegal acts, the auditor is responsible for  designing 
the audit to provide reasonable assurance that the financial  statement amounts 
are free  from  material misstatement resulting from  such acts. However, in 
the case of  indirect effect  illegal acts, the auditor is responsible for  the de-
tection of  such acts only when information  comes to his or her attention con-
cerning their possible existence. The last sentence of  paragraph seven of  SAS 
54 more clearly states the auditor's responsibilities for  indirect illegal acts: 
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"... an audit made in accordance with GAAS provides no assurance that il-
legal acts will be detected or that any contingent liabilities that may result 
will be disclosed." Given this wide disparity in the treatment between direct 
and indirect illegal acts, it is crucial that the auditor is provided with a clearer 
distinction between these two types of  illegal acts. What if  the auditor did not 
detect any illegal acts and therefore,  according to SAS 54, assumed that any 
illegal acts that actually existed were indirect in nature and not within the au-
ditor's responsibilities? Then, in retrospect, assume that a direct effect  ille-
gal act did occur. Since the auditor did not detect nor disclose this act, he or 
she would be liable to the users of  the financial  statements. 
It is clear that the difference  in responsibility for  direct and indirect ille-
gal acts is critical in determining the auditor's liability. The paper and SAS 
54 define  direct and indirect illegal acts primarily by example. We contend 
that their use of  only one example to describe indirect illegal acts, which is 
simplistic compared to the complexities that can and do arise in reality, is in-
sufficient  in leading auditors to consistent application of  the standard. The 
example used in the paper is the same one that was used in SAS 54. To il-
lustrate these complexities consider the following  situation. A chemical man-
ufacturer  is operating at a gross margin of  ten percent while other companies 
in the industry are operating at an average of  five  percent. Suppose that this 
higher gross margin is due to the fact  that the company has failed  to acquire 
the requisite environmental protection equipment. One could argue that the 
difference  in the gross margin has a direct effect  on the financial  statements, 
while another could argue that the effect  of  the illegal act is indirect due to 
fines  or other contingent liabilities that might arise due to the company's fail-
ure to follow  the requirements of  the Environmental Protection Agency 
(EPA). 
A second important issue relates to the auditor's competence in detect-
ing illegal acts. As the authors state in the paper, SAS 54 professes  that au-
ditors do not possess the legal training necessary to recognize all circumstances 
leading to litigation. Also, the SAS contends that the determination as to whether 
or not a particular act is illegal is generally based on the advice of  an informed 
expert qualified  to practice law. Given the auditor's lack of  legal expertise, 
SAS 54 directs the auditor towards management in the search for  illegal 
acts. Further, the paper states that audit procedures rely heavily upon the 
cooperation of  the client's management. However, this heavy reliance on the 
client's management provides only limited evidence of  compliance with laws 
and regulations. And, while this limitation is discussed in the paper, no al-
ternative audit procedures are provided. We believe that the paper should 
highlight procedures outside of  receiving management representations, such 
as examining regulatory approval letters or political contributions. 
The third issue we wish to discuss deals with the "if  necessary" words 
that appear in paragraph twelve of  SAS 54. We believe that SAS 54 is con-
tradicting itself  with this paragraph. It first  disclaims the auditor's competence 
in the area of  illegal acts, and then directs the auditor towards management 
for  information  concerning any such acts. But in paragraph 12, the auditor's 
responsibilities are increased by the "if  necessary" language. This clause takes 
the responsibility off  of  the client, where it rightfully  belongs, and instead al-
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lows the client to force  the auditor to decide the legality of  the client's acts. 
The client should be the one who makes any decisions and arrives at any con-
clusions necessary in regards to alleged illegal acts. The auditor should only 
be required to act upon the decisions of  management. It is our belief  that the 
"if  necessary" clause should be removed from  the SAS 54 and that auditors 
should be required to consult with a legal counsel when any and all illegal 
acts are discovered. 
We are also concerned about one of  the paper's recommendations. The 
authors argue that the auditor's detection responsibility for  illegal acts can-
not be expanded because the auditor is not an expert in the area. This is quite 
true, but auditors are often  forced  to use outside experts in the conduct of 
an audit when they lack the necessary expertise. In fact,  SAS No. 11, Using 
the work  of  a specialist  [AICPA, 1975, and 1989], addresses this subject. 
So why not require the use of  lawyers as outside experts during an audit? 
We are not suggesting that lawyers work alongside auditors throughout the 
audit or be used on every audit. Instead, a lawyer could be required if  the au-
ditor is not satisfied  after  inquiry of  management counsel (the "if  necessary" 
point). At the very least, a reference  should be made to SAS No. 11. 
A fourth  issue deserving of  comment on deals with auditor's neutrality 
towards industry in detecting illegal acts. Seeing no discussion of  this issue 
in the paper and SAS No. 54 implies that the auditor should maintain a neu-
tral attitude across industries. It is our contention that auditors should have 
greater skepticism before  beginning audits in certain industries where ille-
gal acts may be prevalent. The defense,  savings and loan, and securities in-
dustries are prime examples. 
Our fifth  concern about SAS No. 54 deals with the definition  of  qualita-
tive materiality. This issue was not addressed in the paper. SAS No. 54 re-
quires the auditor to evaluate both the quantitative and qualitative materiality 
of  an illegal act that comes to his or her attention. Qualitative materiality is 
defined  by example with a reference  to SAS No. 47 [AICPA, 1983]: "an ille-
gal payment of  an otherwise immaterial amount could be material if  there is 
a reasonable possibility that it could lead to a material contingent liability or 
a material loss of  revenue." We believe that such a definition  is inadequate. 
An illegal act could be "qualitatively material" even if  its quantitative ef-
fect  on the financial  statements is not material now or even several periods 
later. The term "qualitatively material" suggests an illegal act that, if  committed 
by top management or with the knowledge of  top management, would affect 
the decision of  a reasonable user of  the financial  statements. Examples of  such 
illegal acts are: violations of  securities laws, environmental laws, and bidding 
regulations for  government contracts. By not adequately defining  the term, 
SAS 54 may be allowing auditors not to require management disclosure of 
illegal acts which users would be genuinely concerned about. Illegal acts of 
this nature directly reflect  the integrity of  management. 
Investors do actually care about more than merely the quantitative aspects 
of  companies they invest in. The presence of  "clean" mutual funds,  which do 
not invest in companies with major ties to South Africa  or companies with 
operations which harm the environment, is one indicator that investors are 
concerned about the qualitative aspects of  companies they invest in. 
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We believe that qualitative materiality could be better defined.  Of  course, 
it is very difficult  to define  such an ideal standard which could be applied con-
sistently across audits and among auditors. Any new definition  would, of  course, 
require future  research. But a good definition  of  qualitative materiality as it 
applies to illegal acts might include the following  points: 
• The illegal act is a felony. 
• A member of  top management has been convicted of  or charged with, 
or a member of  top management knew of  and could have prevented 
the act. 
• Purely personal acts unrelated to the financial  statements should be 
excluded. 
In regards to our last issue that deals with auditor's responsibility towards 
communicating audit findings,  the authors state: 
One of  the objectives of  the expectation gap SAS's was to improve 
the communications to boards of  directors and audit committees to help 
them fulfill  their financial  reporting and oversight responsibilities. 
While we feel  that SAS 54 does an adequate job improving communica-
tions between auditors and their clients, it falls  short in the task of  closing the 
expectation gap that exists between the public and the auditor in regards to 
the detection of  illegal acts. Many people in the public incorrectly view an au-
ditor as an expert on every matter relating to a client's financial  statements. 
However, according to paragraph three of  SAS 54, an auditor is "one who is 
proficient  in accounting and auditing," not in the detection of  illegal acts. 
One way to close this expectation gap would be to modify  the standard 
unqualified  audit report to include an additional paragraph that deals with the 
client's system of  internal control. Currently, the AICPA has formed  a task 
force  to examine this possibility. An internal control paragraph would serve 
two purposes. First, it would clearly communicate to users that management 
is responsible  for  establishing a system of  internal control. The paragraph might 
also include the following  items that the client's system is supposed to ac-
complish: 
• Provide reliable data, 
• Safeguard  assets, 
• Promote operational efficiency, 
• Encourage adherence to proscribed management policies, 
• Comply with the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 
• Prevent  and detect  illegal acts. 
In addition, the paragraph should state that management is responsible 
for  the design,  installation,  and effectiveness  of  the company's internal control 
system as discussed in SAS 30. Also, the additional paragraph should include 
the auditor's opinion about how the client's internal control system is meet-
ing the above objectives. According to the second standard of  field  work, the 
auditor is only required to obtain an "understanding" of  the client's internal 
control system. In order for  an auditor to express an opinion on the quality 
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of  a client's internal control, more audit procedures may be required. The 
AICPA and auditing firms  would be required to determine the appropriate 
amount of  procedures that are necessary in order to issue an opinion. SAS 
63 [AICPA, 1988] on auditing of  governmental entities may be useful  in de-
signing any standard on the internal control reporting requirements for  pub-
licly traded firms.  Auditors are required to report on the quality of  a 
governmental entity's internal control structure. 
While we believe that the modification  of  the standard audit report to in-
clude an opinion on the client's internal control would help close the expec-
tation gap, it may not be necessary for  all types of  clients. For example, for  a 
small, sole proprietorship with a small number of  financial  users the additional 
cost of  evaluating their internal control system would probably be impracti-
cal. The additional procedures and fourth  paragraph would be most appro-
priate for  publicly traded companies with a large number of  financial  users. 
In conclusion, a conversation that we had with Tom Bintinger, a partner 
with Deloitte & Touche and a member of  the Auditing Standards Board at 
the time SAS 54 was adopted, summed up our reasons for  suggesting a 
change in the standard audit report. He said that it would be far  more con-
structive to establish preventive measures than to increase the auditor's de-
tection responsibilities. After  all, it would be better to stop illegal acts before 
they occur rather than simply discovering them after-the-fact. 
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